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ABSTRACT
Grain hauling railroads began offering shipping alternatives in the late 1980s that have
made transportation decisions more strategic.  Shippers now confront alternatives ranging from
nearby and unguaranteed ordering to various durations of forward and guaranteed shipment.  A
dynamic stochastic simulation model was developed to analyze grain shipping and
merchandising strategies that integrate these alternatives.  
Key words:  railroads, grain merchandising, logistics, simulation, risk analysisvii
HIGHLIGHTS
Grain hauling railroads began offering shipping alternatives in the late 1980s that have
made transportation decisions more strategic.  Shippers now confront alternatives ranging from
nearby and unguaranteed ordering to various durations of forward and guaranteed shipments. 
Each has various penalties for cancellation and payments from the railroad for non-performance
and differing risks and payoffs.  As a result of the configuration of choices, shippers confront a
portfolio of shipping alternatives.   
This research analyzes grain shipping and merchandising strategies that integrate these
alternatives.  Specific objectives are: 1) to develop a logistics model capturing critical
components of operations and costs and 2) to analyze a spectrum of rail logistical strategies
representing varying degrees of forward commitment.  Key elements of merchandising and
shipping uncertainty were taken into account to be reflective of a typical North Dakota elevator.   
A dynamic stochastic simulation model was developed based on inventory management,
transportation choice, and scheduling theories.  An expected payoff function was defined as the
difference between expected total revenues and total costs.  Total revenues consist of grain sales
and non-performance receipts from rail carriers.  Total costs include those associated with
acquisition, transportation, carrying, handling, and cancellation costs.  The analysis includes the
effect of uncertainties in tariff rate levels, car premiums, basis levels, forward and spot grain
purchases, and receiving railcars under general tariff service.  Shipping demand is determined by
inter-month price differences and carrying costs, transport costs, and storage capacity. 
Considering these factors, the shipper chooses grain sales and shipping strategies that maximize
net payoffs. 
   
In the base case, simulations were conducted on designated shipping strategies.  Various
levels of long-term contractual car guarantees (G ), i.e., SWAPs and GEEPs, were chosen. 
L
Shipping demand not met with G s and general tariff cars were filled with shorter-term, auction-
L
based car guarantees (G ), i.e., COTs or PERX.  Simulations were conducted to determine effects
S
of different strategies on payoffs and risk.  Results indicated that, in general, the strategy with the
lowest risk required a greater use of G s.  Strategies making greater use of G  provided increased
LS
payoffs, but also greater risk.   
Simulations were conducted to evaluate effects of uncertainty on a spectrum of shipping
strategies.  Four important elements of uncertainty were examined: 1) shipping demand, 2)
carrying cost, 3) general tariff service  reliability, and 4) G  premium levels.  Sensitivity analysis
S
provided some insight on relationships between G  and G  shipping strategies and changes in
SL
these key elements of uncertainty.  The G  Intensive strategy provided the greatest expected
S
payoff in addition to the greatest risk.  Uncertainty in shipping demand had the most influence on
risk.  Integration of G  into a shipping strategy reduces risk.  Increased use of contracts with
L
growers for forward delivery reduces uncertainty and significantly reduces risk in grain shipping. viii
       The model was simulated assuming different levels of longer-term forward coverage in
the freight market.  A number of general effects can be identified as shipping strategies make
greater use of long-term guarantees: 
 Forward contracts for grain purchases escalate in importance.
 Shipment patterns become less seasonal.
 G  (G ) premiums become less (more) critical to the expected payoff.
SL
The reliability of receiving cars under general tariff has an important
influence on expected payoff levels across strategies.  
Findings from this study provide a better understanding of G  and G  strategies for
SL
shippers, carriers, and public policymakers. Graduate research assistant and professor, respectively, in the Department of Agricultural Economics,
*
North Dakota State University, Fargo.
 See Priewe and Wilson (1997) for a detailed description of these mechanisms.
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FORWARD SHIPPING OPTIONS FOR GRAIN BY RAIL: 
A STRATEGIC RISK ANALYSIS  
Steven R. Priewe and William W.  Wilson
*
INTRODUCTION  
Railcar allocation strategies have evolved dramatically since passage of the Staggers Rail
Act of 1980.  To become more efficient and meet the needs of logistically differentiated grain
shippers, the rail industry has focused more on service, by providing more shipping options.  Of
particular interest, railroads have developed forward service options with guarantees for railcar
supplies that provide logistical alternatives to grain shippers.  As a result, shippers have more
logistics planning tools, but are challenged with the integration of grain merchandising and
logistical decisions. 
Chronic post-harvest rail transportation problems have adversely affected those in the
grain industry for some time (Norton 1995).  Before 1987, rail rate and car supply guarantees
were not offered in the grain transportation market.  Service was determined to some extent by
luck, but more important, the ability to integrate and execute shipping and merchandising
strategies was limited.  Shippers had few alternatives to manage railcar risks (rates and service)
and had to absorb greater merchandising risks (Gelston and Greene 1994).  During peak
demands, cars were normally allocated on a first-order, first-serve basis.  Shippers tended to
inflate orders to secure railcars because of the absence of car cancellation penalties.  “Phantom
orders” were prevalent, and general car allocation mechanisms did little to address post-harvest
transportation problems confronting the grain merchandising/transportation industry (Wilson
1989).
Railroads addressed these problems through development of innovative railcar allocation
mechanisms.  Beginning in the late 1980s, major railroads began to renovate traditional
allocation methods.  Burlington Northern (BN) pioneered these efforts with the introduction of
its Certificates of Transport (COTs) program in 1987.  Under COTs, forward guarantees are
offered to grain shippers using a bidding mechanism.  Shipper prepayments served as
cancellation penalties and discouraged “phantom orders.”  Because of these mechanisms,
shippers were segmented and cars were allocated according to shipping priorities.  Since then,
CPRS, Union Pacific, CSX, and other major Class One rail lines have adopted certain aspects of
auction-based rate and car guarantee programs.  Transferability of these instruments provided
shippers flexibility and has resulted in informal secondary markets and transaction mechanisms
for COTs, PERX, and other short-term guarantee instruments.   
1
In the early 1990s, longer-term guaranteed freight programs were introduced.  These
mechanisms allowed grain companies to enter longer-term contractual arrangements where
railcars are leased to the carrier in return for a negotiated fee and a number of guaranteed trips
per month.  Examples of such programs include BN SWAPs and CPRS GEEPs.  These rail Others have indicated the need for strategic analyzes of grain shipping decisions (Baumel and Van
2
Der Kamp 1996, Frost 1996, Niedens 1996 and Moser 1995).
 However, the model is generally applicable to most grain shipping firms.
3
 Uniqueness of chronic post-harvest logistical problems has been addressed in previous studies on
4
logistics theory and rail industry applications.  Studies on time reliability (Allen et al. 1985), railroad service
(Ainsworth 1972), requirements planning (Bookbinder and Serenda 1987), and modal selection (Sheffi et al.
1988) provided foundational literature for model development.
 Noted advantages of simulation modeling reside in the ability to experiment with policy changes
5
within a controlled environment.  Such models have been widely applied to transportation, inventory, and
economic systems (Bierman et al. 1991).
2
equipment supply packages generally consist of an annual contract for a monthly number of
guaranteed unit train placements.  These programs also have cancellation penalties for carrier and
shipper non-performance.  Shippers participating in these pooling arrangements redeem their
obligations or sell them through secondary markets.  The contracted nature of guaranteed freight
programs and transferability of these instruments have led to informal secondary markets where
these instruments trade.     
Taken together, these innovations present grain shippers with options, including general
tariff, shorter-term, auction-based rate and car guarantees (e.g., COTs and PERX), and longer-
term contractual car guarantees (e.g., SWAPS and GEEPs).  The advent of forward guaranteed
transportation services in grain merchandising has given shippers options for strategically
integrating logistics and merchandising decisions.   Each has various penalties for cancellation
2
and payments for the railroad for non-performance and differing risks and payoffs that must be
an integral component of the decision analysis.  Because of the configuration of choices, shippers
can view a portfolio of alternatives, increasing the importance of integrating grain merchandising
and shipping decisions.  
This research analyzes grain shipping and merchandising strategies which integrate these
alternatives.  Specific objectives include: 1) to develop a logistics model applicable to grain
shippers which capture critical components of operations and costs and 2) to analyze a spectrum
of rail logistical strategies representing varying degrees of forward commitment and their
relationships with key elements of planning uncertainty for a model of a typical North Dakota
grain shipper.     
3
MODEL DESCRIPTION
A dynamic stochastic simulation model was developed based on inventory management,
transportation choice, and scheduling theory.   A simulation approach to the modeling logistical
4
system allows inclusion of interrelated components and multiple sources of uncertainty.   
5
The model was applied to a shipper characterized by a single origin country elevator
shipping to competing markets, in this case either Minneapolis or Portland.  The model is
dynamic in the sense that grain selling and shipping decisions are made through time, and The mathematical formulation of the model is presented in Appendix I.  Winston (1996) provides a
6
guide to simulation modeling with @RISK.
3
residual inventories are stored to the next month.  Shipping demand is determined by an
evaluation of inter-month price differentials, interest and transport costs, and storage capacity. 
The shipper maximizes the expected net payoff each month by shipping in the month and market
with the highest net payoff.  Expected Annual Net Payoff [E(ANP)] is the difference between
total revenues and total costs.  Revenues consist of receipts from grain sales and non-
performance payments from rail carriers.  Costs include transportation, handling, carrying
(including interest) costs, and shipper cancellation penalties.
The analysis captures uncertainties confronting shippers, including tariff rates, car
premiums, basis, forward/spot purchases from farmers, and receipt of railcars under general tariff
service.    
SIMULATION PROCEDURE AND DATA SOURCES
The model was developed in a @RISK stochastic simulation format compatible with
Lotus 1-2-3.    A specified number of iterations of the model are made; and, in each, distributions
6
for random parameters are sampled, and estimates for derived parameters are calculated. 
Specified outputs are recorded from each iteration, and expected values and standard deviations
are computed at the end of the simulation. 
Model Simulation Procedure
The model consists of three modules: (1) parameter values,  (2) statistical distribution of
data, and (3) output variables are derived and recorded for specified ranges.  
Input Parameters
The following input variables are specified: train size, railcar capacity, tariff rates, carrier
performance payment for a Short-term (G ) and a Long-term (G ) Guarantee, uncertainty about
SL
forward and spot purchases, storage capacity, turnover ratio, annual carrying cost (interest rate),
handing cost, and probabilities of receiving trains for the different service options.  Table 1
presents the fixed input variables for the model.
Statistical Distributions
The following variables are included as random variables: MPLS and  PNW basis,
expected tariff rate changes to MPLS and PNW, G  and G  premiums, spot and forward contract
SL
deliveries, and variables used to derive allocation of general tariff cars.  Statistical distributions
for these and other variables are shown in Table 2.  Output
Output variables include annual revenues and costs based on monthly profit-maximizing,
shipping decisions.  Revenues consist of revenue from grain sales and carrier non-performance
receipts.  Costs include transportation, carrying (interest), handling, and shipper cancellation
penalty expenditures.  General tariff, short-term guarantee, and long-term guarantee costs  are
each components of transportation costs.  Expected profit is derived from these values.  Statistics
are reported for mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, and percentiles for all specified
inputs and outputs.
Table 1.  Fixed Input Variables for Country Elevator Logistical Model
Parameter Value
Train size 26 cars/unit train
Car capacity 3,300 bushels/car
Unit train elevator storage capacity 1,107,262 bushels
Unit train elevator turnover ratio 5 
Carrying cost 9.25 percent
Excess carrying cost 12.25 percent
Handling cost 12 cents/bushel
Minneapolis 26-car tariff rate $2,063/car
Pacific Northwest 26-car tariff rate $4,280/car
Forward purchase contract percentage  25 percent
Spot purchase percentage 75 percent
Forward contract uncertainty: August-November 5 percent of Expected Value 
Forward contract uncertainty: December-March 10 percent of Expected Value
Forward contract uncertainty: April-July 15 percent of Expected Value
G  carrier performance guarantee $400/car
S
G  carrier performance guarantee $250/car
L
Shipper cancellation penalty $250/car5
5
Table 2.  Data Distribution Parameters
Units Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May June July
MPLS Basis
     Average c/bu 42 40 43 48 46 36 40.67 42.63 51.54 58.13 50.42 52.23
     Standard Deviation c/bu 33 42 47 44 36 31 39.17 34.41 33.75 35.79 24.63 32.84
PNW Basis 
     Average c/bu 103 99 101 111 102 102 101.50 110.63 113.88 118.87 109.25 107.32
     Standard Deviation c/bu 42 39 47 43 45 46 54.59 61.24 60.33 57.95 33.34 35.72
MPLS Rate Change
     Average   % 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01
     Standard Deviation % 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.02
PNW Rate Change
     Average   % 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
     Standard Deviation % 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
G  Premium (Discount)
S
     Average $/car 18 48 155 225 220 140 128 105 36 22 9 4
     Standard Deviation $/car 30 47 37 43 22 52 44 37 11 50 4 2
G P r e m i u m
L
     Average $/car 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Spot Transactions  
     Average % 12.23 11.46 8.92 8.38 8.46 8.54 6.23 7.38 6.69 5.92 9.00 6.77
     Standard Deviation % 5.43 1.98 2.29 1.50 2.40 3.78 1.24 1.39 1.18 2.18 2.12 2.17
General Tariff Allocation  
     Three Year Moving                     cars 6,116 5,967 5,642 5,727 4,326 4,395 4,667 3,926 3,175 3,193 3,440
     Average of  Cars in District 4,192
     Shipped Production in Region cars 15,387 15,407 13,703 13,057 13,462 15,776 9,213 10,675 8,126 5,504 9,993 7,696
     Estimated Supply-Demand          % 0.40 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.27 0.48 0.44 0.48 0.58 0.32 0.45





















+1 S.D. MPLS Mean -1 S.D.
6
Figure 1.  Minneapolis Basis Levels.
Data: Sources and Behavior  
This section describes parameters, data sources, and estimation procedures.  Market
prices, grain supplies, shipping costs, railcar placements, and related parameters are presented. 
Market Prices
Market prices were based on futures prices and basis values in April 1996.  Average basis
levels for HRS wheat were derived for 1989 to 1994 (Flaskerud 1995) and are treated as random
variables with normal distributions.  This basis component reflects the random nature of market
movements which trigger shipping demand (see Figures 1 and 2).  The correlation between
MPLS and PNW basis levels of .81 was incorporated into the model.
Grain Purchases
Estimates of grain purchases were derived to reflect a typical single origin shipper in
North Dakota.  Estimates for forward and spot and beginning/ending stocks were obtained from

























+1 S.D. PNW Mean -1 S.D.
 These were rounded from 34 percent forward and 66 percent spot to simplify later sensitivity
7
analyzes.
 An @RISK simulation procedure was used to add uncertainty around a fixed trend.
8
7
Figure 2.  Pacific Northwest Basis Levels.
Estimates of Grain Purchases.  Grain purchases were derived as follows.  First, the
expected annual shipment volume of a typical North Dakota elevator was derived.  A typical
elevator storage capacity and an average turnover ratio were used to derive total volume (Gelston 
and Greene 1994;  Andreson and Vachal 1995).  The percentage of crop year totals sold by
producers (North Dakota Agricultural Statistics 1991-95) and, therefore, purchased by elevators
was applied to determine monthly purchases by elevators.
    Monthly purchases consisted of both spot and forward transactions, each with different
levels of uncertainty.  The split between forward and spot delivery transactions (forward/spot
delivery ratio) was 25 percent and 75 percent, respectively (Stearns 1994).   Spot deliveries are
7
treated as a random variable with a normal distribution.  Monthly expected values and standard
deviations for this parameter were calculated from the North Dakota Agricultural Statistics.
Forward purchases were derived similarly.  The volume purchased under forward 
contracts was assumed to have less uncertainty, with the level increasing in more distant 
months.   Graduated levels were established around a fixed level of forward contracts: 5 percent
8
standard deviation for one to four months forward positions; 10 percent standard deviation for
five to nine months forward positions; 15 percent standard deviation for 10 to 12 months forward
positions.  This feature was added to reflect uncertainty shippers confront during the post-harvest






























































































   Estimates were obtained with a commonly utilized method for measuring commodity market
9
volatility (Cox and Rubenstein 1985, pg. 257).  Under this procedure, the logarithm of inter-month rate ratios
is computed.  The square root of the natural logarithm provides estimated standard deviation for each month.
8
Figure 3.  Estimate Levels of Forward Contracted and Spot Deliveries to Elevator.
Shipping Costs
Shipping costs were comprised of several elements.  
Tariff Rate Levels.  Burlington Northern 26-car tariff rate levels from Devils Lake, ND,
to Minneapolis and Pacific Northwest markets were used as of April 1, 1996 (Burlington
Northern Tariff ICC-BN-4022 G-I).  However, shippers confront the risk that rail rates may
increase.  Figure 4 illustrates the frequency of historical rate changes.  
The potential for changes in tariff rates was included in the model using a procedure of 
“variation around a fixed trend” (@RISK 1994, p. 5-13).  Monthly average rate changes were
derived from tariff rate data from 1990 to 1994.   Ratios of monthly rates and estimated standard
9
deviations provide the necessary data to establish an average monthly rate trend and uncertainty
Grain shippers face tariff rate uncertainty in addition to car placement uncertainty when
making forward rail transportation plans.  While G  instruments have only tariff rate uncertainty,
L
G  instruments have both tariff rate and premium uncertainties.  Tariff rates indicate a greater
S
likelihood of rate changes in certain months for both the Minneapolis and Pacific Northwest
markets.  Expected rate changes were limited to increases because of the rare occurrence of rate
decreases.  The MPLS and PNW tariff rates had a correlation of .82 for 1990-94.  This value was
included in the @RISK correlation matrix to capture the effects in these random variables. 
Figure 5 illustrates the rate change relationships between MPLS and PNW tariff rates represented
in the model.  Inclusion of these rate relationships in the model captures the potential rate risks


































































Figure 4.  Minneapolis (MPLS) and Pacific Northwest (PNW) Tariff Rates, 1990-94.































































 Average monthly COT premiums for 1995 were used in the base case to more accurately reflect
10
the market situation for Spring 1996.
   Harvest States Cooperatives’ “Rail Equipment Supply Program” facsimile for February 8, 1996.
11
10
Figure 6.  Short-term and Long-term Guarantee Premiums (Discounts).
Short-term Guarantee Premiums (Discounts).  Means for G  were assumed equal to the
S
1995 monthly averages, and the parameter was treated as a random variable.  Average monthly
BN COTs values for 1993-95 were used to estimate distribution parameters for Short-term
Guarantees (G ) (Figure 6).   Premium levels are identical for the MPLS and PNW movements,
S1 0
and all rate differences between the two markets are captured in the tariff rates.  Therefore, G
S
shippers confront both tariff rate and premium uncertainties in the model.  All G  are assumed to
S
be purchased through the primary market. 
Long-term Guarantees.  Long-term Guarantee (G ) premiums are treated as a non-random
L
variable to reflect the contracted nature of the instrument.  Examples include BN SWAPs and
CPRS GEEPs which typically have one to three-year terms.  G  rates were obtained from Harvest
L
States transportation packages for Spring 1996 (Figure 6).   These  premiums are fixed, but the
11
rate level is subject to the tariff rate at the time of shipment.
Railcar Placements
Allocation mechanisms have differing degrees of reliability.  Service differentials
between rail logistical options were included in the model for general tariff and non-tariff (G
S
and G ) allocation mechanisms.  This section describes the procedures used to derive railcar
L

































Figure 7.  Probability of Receipt for Short-term (G ) and Long-term (G ) Guarantees.
SL
Service Reliability Under Guaranteed Service Options.  Service parameters for Short-
term and Long-term Guarantees were treated as discrete probabilities.  The probability of receipt
was defined as one minus the likelihood of carrier default.  Estimates of the probabilities of
receiving cars within the shipping period were obtained through interviews with rail and grain
industry contacts (Wood 1996, Strege 1996).  Both sources noted a slightly higher performance
level for G  over G  due to the carrier performance incentives associated with the G  instrument. 
SL S
Table 3 and Figure 7 present these probabilities.  
Table 3.  Probability of Car Placement Estimates for Short-term and Long-term
Guarantees 
Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul 
G .99 .99 .98 .98 .95 .95 .95 .95 .98 .99 .99 .99
S
G .95 .95 .90 .90 .85 .85 .85 .85 .90 .90 .95  .95
L
Car Allocation for General Tariff Services.   Similar data are not attainable for car
placement under general tariff services.  Thus,  a method was developed to approximate the
probability of receiving general tariff cars.  These estimates were incorporated with general tariff
allocation logic to determine the likelihood of receiving cars under this option.  Shippers are assumed to prefer to move grain with lower-cost tariff cars if possible.  For this
12
reason, the summation of the monthly car totals for each commodity serves as the proxy for the total monthly
general tariff demand.
12
Monthly railcar supply and demand estimates were calculated for North Dakota.  Demand
estimates were derived from several sources.  First, average production levels for 1990-94 were
computed for wheat, barley, sunflower, oats, soybeans, flaxseed, and corn from historic estimates
of principle crops harvested in North Dakota (North Dakota Agricultural Statistics 1995). 
rucking shares of the average annual production (tons) were netted out, assuming a fixed annual
rail-truck ratio for each commodity using average annual rail and truck percentages for 1990-94
from North Dakota Grain and Oilseed Transportation Statistics (Andreson and Vachal 1995,
Andreson et al. 1994, Busch and Vachal 1993).  Rail shares of annual production were converted
to car units, using load factors for each commodity (BN State Statistics 1993).  Average total
monthly grain and oilseed market sales were computed by multiplying derived average
percentages of crop year totals sold in open market for 1990-94 (North Dakota Agricultural
Statistics 1995).  This total served as the railcar demand estimate for North Dakota.  
12
Railcar supply estimates for North Dakota were derived using several sources.  North
Dakota grain movement for 1993-95 served as the basis for these estimates (Andreson et al.
1994, Andreson and Vachal 1995).  First, three-year average monthly totals were computed for
wheat, barley, sunflowers, oats, flaxseed, and corn.  These totals were converted into cars using
1993 BN load factors (BN State Statistics 1993).  Non-tariff movements were subtracted from
these totals, assuming a fixed annual percentage of tariff movements (Vachal 1995).  This total
served as the railcar supply estimate for North Dakota.    
An algorithm was developed to simulate the general tariff allocation procedures used by
the BN (Burlington Northern Tariff ICC-BN-4022 I).  If car supply exceeded car demand, the
shipper receives one train for that month; otherwise, a random draw is conducted to determine
receipt.  A shipper was awarded one 26-car unit-train if a randomly generated number from a
uniform distribution in the model is less than the supply and demand ratio.  Otherwise, the
elevator receives no general tariff cars for the month.  The uniform distribution between zero and
one assures that each number has an equal likelihood of occurrence.  Residual supplies, if
present, are also randomly allocated to shippers.
Shipping Demand
Shipping demand was derived from the value of the expected net payoff of holding grain
for an additional month.  This formulation evaluates inter-month price differences of interest
costs, transport costs, and storage capacity to determine whether stocks should be shipped or
stored.  Monthly grain stocks are shipped if (P  - P) < (I + E(S).  If the inter-month price t+1 t
spread (P  - P) is greater than the estimated marginal cost of storage (I) and the expected change t+1 t
in transport (E(S)), then grain is stored.  Specifically, grain stocks are not shipped and are stored
if (P  - P) > (I + E(S)).  However, if the total monthly grain supplies (TGS) exceed the storage t+1 t
capacity (SC), then shipping demand is equal to the excess inventory.  These conditions are
summarized in Table 4.13
Table 4.  Determination of Monthly Shipping Demand
Evaluation Ship/Store
(P  - P) > (I + E(S)) Store   t+1 t
(P  - P) < (I) + (E(S)) Ship  t+1 t
TGS > SC Ship excess grain stocks
When there is a carry in the market ((P  - P) > (I + E(S))) and total monthly grain t+1 t
supplies are less than storage capacity, shipping demand is zero.  If the inter-month total price
spread is less than the cost of storage and transport, the shipping demand is total monthly grain
supplies.  Ultimately, random movements in the inter-month price spreads and  basis levels
generate shipping demand in the model.
Car-ordering Strategies
Shipping demand is the basis for implementing the car-ordering strategies.  Shippers use
of general tariff orders for a component of their requirements, accepting them whenever positive
shipping demand is present and they are awarded one.  Varying levels of long-term commitments
(G ) were evaluated and any monthly shipping demand not met with G  and general tariff cars
L L
would be filled with short-term guarantees (G ).  The shipper orders general tariff cars, accepting
S
cars whenever positive shipping demand was present and they were awarded.  
Alternative shipping strategies considered in the analysis are presented in Table 5.  
Table 5.  Spectrum of Shipping Strategies
G
L





G  Intensive (0-G ) 0 0 Random *
SL
G  Mix (2-G ) 2 33 Random *
SL
G  Mix (4-G ) 4 67 Random *
LL
G  Intensive (6-G ) 6 100 Random *
LL
*     Determined dynamically within the model.  Specifically, each shipping strategy consists of a        
      given G  position with general tariff and G  cars filling residual shipping demand, when present.
LS
             **   Derived as the expected value of car placement under longer-term guarantees.  These represent

















































 The E(ANP) was solved without deducting the cost of wheat. The estimated cost of wheat for the
13
elevator was defined as the average of the gross revenue on grain sales less transportation costs across the
established shipping strategies.  This value was deducted from the solution value from the simulations.    
 The model was also run assuming 0-G  and 0-G , implying that the shipping strategy was 100
14 LS
percent on the general tariff option.  Simulations indicate that the E(ANP) was ($21,230,016) and excess
grain stocks reached 3.8 million bushels.  Effectively, these results illustrate an inability to meet annual
shipping requirements and the need to expand storage capacity if the shipper relied solely on general tariff
cars.    
14
Figure 8.  Expected Annual Net Payoff by Shipping Strategy.
SIMULATION SCENARIOS AND RESULTS
  The base case scenario is presented first, followed by simulations of changes in key
variables affecting uncertainty.
Base Case:  Expected Annual Net Payoff
A fundamental question for all shippers is the portion of shipments made under longer-
term guarantees versus shorter-term options.  Results from this analysis illustrate the differences. 
As the shipper’s strategy makes greater use of longer-term guarantees, the E(ANP) decreases at 
an increasing rate.  The maximum E(ANP) was $582,085 with a shipping strategy of zero G s
L
(i.e., G  Intensive).   Under the G  Intensive strategy the shipper relies on general tariff cars and
S1 3 S
supplements the remainder of shipping demand solely with G  (i.e., G  = 0).  The E(ANP)
SL
declines to $(248,335) with a G  strategy of six unit trains per month (Figure 8).   Results
L1 4
indicate a $541,880 reduction in total revenues on grain sales going from the E(ANP)
maximizing strategy to 100 percent coverage with longer-term guarantees (Figure 9).  Total






























































































Figure 9.  Total Annual Revenue on Grain Sales by Shipping Strategy.
Figure 10.  Relationship Between Shipping Strategy and Monthly Shipments.
The relationship between E(ANP) and shipping strategy is a result of a number of factors. 
First,  G s remove marketing flexibility, forcing shipments in otherwise sub-optimal shipping
L
periods.  As the number of G s increase, the country elevator’s shipping patterns are governed
L
less by market spreads and more by railcar positions and associated obligations.  Figure 10
illustrates the monthly shipping patterns in G  and G  Intensive strategies.  As illustrated,
SL


















































 Absolute risk (standard deviation) is minimized somewhere between the 4-G  and 5-G  strategy at
15 LL
about $1.8 million. A strategy of 5-G s results in an E(ANP) of $132,595 and a standard deviation of $1.831
L
million;  the 4-G  strategy results in a standard deviation of $1.835 million and an E(ANP) of $254,275.  An
L




Figure 11.  Relationship Among Shipper Cancellation Penalties (SCP), Total Carrying Cost
(TCC), and Shipping Strategy.
A second factor is that Shipper Cancellation Penalties are more frequent with greater use
of G , increasing from nil with the G  Intensive strategy to $48,428 with the G  Intensive strategy
LS L
(Figure 11).  Uncertainties in the level of grain supplies generate a greater frequency of being in
an excess car position with more fixed shipping strategies.  Declining carrying costs reflect the
lower levels of grain stocks.  G  strategies enable shippers to better target months with favorable
S
prices and to avoid cancellation penalties when grain stocks and therefore shipping demand are
nil.
Standard Deviation of Expected Annual Net Payoff
As the shipper’s strategy becomes more long-term intensive, the standard deviation of
E(ANP) diminishes and reaches a minimum at 5-G s, increasing thereafter (Figure 12).   Lower
L1 5
risk levels reflect the stability in the shipping patterns that are realized with such commitments,
























Figure 12.  Standard Deviation of Expected Annual Net Payoff by Shipping Strategy.
Trade-offs between E(ANP) and risk are illustrated in Figure 13.  These typify a
conventional trade-off between risks and payoffs.  Generally, increased profits can be attained
with different strategies, but only by incurring greater risks.  In this case, risks for the shipper
would be minimized with a longer-term car guarantee strategy of 4-5 trains per month, or, more
generally, covering between 66 and 83 percent of annual shipping requirements using longer-
term guarantees.  The residual would be covered using service either under shorter-term
guarantees or general tariffs.  Profits increase with less use of longer term guarantees and
increased use of shorter term guarantees.  By only using tariffs and shorter term guarantees,
profits would increase by 56 percent, but risk would also increase, relative to the minimum risk
strategy.  Ultimately, the selection of a shipping strategy depends on the risk preferences of the
decision maker.
Results of Sensitivity Analysis
Simulations were conducted to evaluate effects of sources of uncertainty on the spectrum
of shipping strategies.  To do so and simplify the presentation, 50 percent increases and decreases
were assumed from base case values.  Important elements of uncertainty were selected for
analysis: 1) general tariff service reliability, 2) G  premium levels 3) the ratio of forward to spot
S
grain purchases (F/S Ratio), and 4) carrying cost.  A summary of results from sensitivity analyzes
on key elements is presented (Table 6 and 7).  The effects of these variables on E(ANP) and risks
are discussed with respect to the G  and G  Intensive strategies.    































































Figure 13.  Shipper Trade-offs for Alternative Rail Strategies.
Reliability of General Tariff Service.  Reliability in car placement under general tariff
shipments is an important problem for grain shippers (Pedraza 1996).  The likelihood of receipt
of general tariff cars depends on the distribution of the supply-demand ratio, and thus, whether
cars are randomly allocated, or not.  Simulations were conducted on a 50 percent increase and
decrease in this supply-demand percentage which affects the probability of receiving general
tariff cars.  Such changes in reliability levels could be the result of irregularities in the 
grain transportation market.  
Reliability of general tariff service had the greatest effect on shipping strategies that
depend more on shorter-term commitments.  E(ANP) is positively affected by changes in general
tariff service reliability.  Increases in service reliability resulted in increases in profit from the
base case levels for each strategy ranging from 16 percent (0-G ) to 29 percent (6-G ).  Decreases
LL
in service reliability result in negative percentage changes ranging from -14 percent (0-G ) to -31
L
percent (6-G ).  
L
Improvements (declines) in the service reliability lead to less (greater) uncertainty in tariff
car receipt.  The impact of service reliability on E(ANP) increases with the more G  Intensive
L
strategies.  This suggests that the G  strategy is less affected by swings in tariff service.  The
S
more fixed G  Intensive strategies realize greater revenue on grain sales and lower shipper
L
cancellation penalties from higher service reliability.1
9
Table 6.  Summary of Simulation Results: Expected Annual Net Payoff and Standard Deviation
 1
                       Expected Annual Net Payoff                                Standard Deviation of Expected Annual Net Payoff    
Shipping Strategy Shipping Strategy
0 G 2 G 4 G 6 G 0 G 2 G 4 G 6 G
LLLLL LL L
Adjusted Base Case 582,085 419,455 254,275 (248,335) 2,209,116 1,989,782 1,835,187 1,900,693
Level
150% Tariff Service 94,090 92,580 68,480 71,540 (2,708) 205 11,711 12,198
Reliability
50% Tariff Service (81,670) (80,840) (70,060) (77,290) (8,328) (5,924) (4,641) (9,519)
Reliability
150% G  Premium 0 (36,680) (73,350) (110,020) 0 0 0 0
L
50% G  Premium 0 36,670 73,340 110,020 0 0 0 0
L
150% F/S Ratio  280 890 5,860 29,330 (186,640) (213,358) (237,953) (261,648)
50% F/S Ratio   (1,050) (1,660) (10,320) (35,770) 206,740 232,445 258,638 278,231
150% G  Premium (75,670) (50,600) (25,060) (5,290) (2,633) (3,191) (3,556) (1,871)
S
50% G  Premium 72,030 47,430 22,840 4,200 3,376 3,415 3,469 1,664
S
150% Carrying Cost (6,390) (9,080) (8,340) (9,860) (9,584) (3,490) (998) (2,161)
50% Carrying Cost (25,460) (14,720) (40) 10,070 24,809 12,719 2,078 1,291




 Table 7.  Summary of the Simulation Results: Percentage Change from the Base Case
                    Expected Annual Net Payoff                           Standard Deviation of Expected Annual Net Payoff   
Shipping Strategy Shipping Strategy
0 G 2 G 4 G 6 G 0 G 2 G 4 G 6 G
LLL L L L L L
150% Tariff 16.2 22.1 26.9 28.8 (0.1) 0.0 0.6 0.6
Service
Reliability
50% Tariff (14.0) (19.3) (27.6) (31.1) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5)
Service
Reliability
150% G 0.0 (8.7) (28.8) (44.3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
L
Premium
50% G  Premium 0.0 8.7 28.8 44.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
L
150% F/S Ratio  0.1 0.2 2.3 11.8 (8.4) (10.7) (13.0) (13.8)
50% F/S Ratio  (0.2) (0.4) (4.1) (14.4) 9.3 11.7 14.0 14.6
150% G (13.0) (12.1) (9.9) (2.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
S
Premium
50% G  Premium 12.4 11.3 9.0 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
S
150% Carrying (1.1) 2.2 (3.3) (4.0) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1)
Cost
50% Carrying (4.4) (3.5) 0.0 4.1 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.1
Cost The G  Intensive strategy was unaffected by G  premium changes since this strategy does not use
16 SL
the G  instrument.
L
21
The standard deviation was relatively unaffected by changes in the tariff service
reliability.  This is likely due to the general tariff allocation logic which depends on a random
draw and the limited percentage of total shipments made with the tariff option. 
G  Premiums.  G  premiums had the greatest impact on Expected Annual Net Payoffs
LL
for strategies with more longer-term coverage.  This parameter had an inverse relationship with
the E(ANP).   Increases in G  premiums resulted in a decrease from the base case levels for the
16 L
G Mix (-8 percent), G Mix (-29 percent), and G  Intensive (-44 percent) strategies.  Decreases in
S L  L
G  premiums resulted in increases from the base case levels for the G Mix (8 percent), G Mix
L S L 
(29 percent), and G  Intensive (44 percent) strategies.    
L
G  premium changes had no impact on the standard deviation of E(ANP) for each
L
shipping strategy.  This relationship reflects the fixity of the contract premium levels.  
Uncertainty in Forward Grain Purchases.    Purchases of grain from farmers result in a
great source of uncertainty for shippers.  During pre-harvest, producers and, therefore, shippers
have a high degree of uncertainty due to growing season risk.  In the post-harvest period,
uncertainty also exists around farmer delivery patterns.  However, grain bought under forward
contracts has less uncertainty, resulting in a greater ability to plan logistics requirements. 
Uncertainties about farmer sales patterns result in uncertainty in shipping demand and, therefore,
risks associated with railcar strategies.  These effects are an important part of the model.  To
evaluate this effect, simulations were conducted on a 50 percent increase and decrease in the
forward contracted level across each forward shipping strategy.  Changes in the level of forward
purchases ultimately affect the level of spot purchases since these two parameters complement
one another to comprise total purchases.  This relationship is refer to as the Forward/Spot (F/S)
ratio.
E(ANP) has a positive relationship with changes in the percent of forward purchases
(i.e., the portion of the crop purchased under forward contract versus spot).  Increases (decreases)
in the level of forward contracted deliveries increases (decreases) the expected payoffs across
strategies.  Increases in forward deliveries result in positive percentage increases in the base case
levels for each strategy, ranging from 0 to 12 percent with the 0-G  and 6-G , respectively. 
LL
Decreases resulted in negative percentage changes ranging from 0 to -14 percent.  The G
L
Intensive strategy was the most responsive to changes in the forward/spot delivery ratio.
Forward deliveries had the largest absolute and percentage impact on risk across
strategy.  Sensitivities showed an inverse relationship between changes in the level of forward
contracts and the standard deviation of Expected Annual Net Payoff.  Greater use of forward
contracted deliveries results in less risk.  Forward contract purchases are more important as the
strategy becomes more G  Intensive (see Table 7).  The strategic implication of this is important:
L
an increase in grain purchased under forward contract reduces uncertainty in shipping demand,
making forward shipping alternatives more effective and lessening the risk of cancellation
penalties.22
G  Premiums (Discounts).  G  and G  premiums vary with grain transportation market
SS L
conditions.  Shippers can take positions as far forward as six months before the shipping period
with certain G  programs.  However, premiums tend to be seasonal, and volatile annual
S
production levels can result in unanticipated shifts in G  premiums (Wilson 1995).  Positions and
S
premiums for G  instruments can be made one to three years in advance at fixed premiums
L
through forward contracts.  Uncertainty also exists over the actual future value of the G
L
instrument.  Thus, the relationship between G  premiums, which are random, and G  premiums,
SL
which can be locked for extended periods, is critical.  
Volatility in G  premiums was captured in the model with the normal distribution based
S
on monthly BN COTs data from 1993-95 (Wilson 1996).  G  premiums were fixed at their April
L
1996 value of $130 per car to reflect their contractual nature.  Changes were evaluated with 50
percent increases and decreases in the mean to reflect potential longer-term shifts in premium
levels.  Simulations were conducted on upward and downward shifts across shipping strategies.
The G  premium level had an inverse relationship with E(ANP).  Higher premiums
S
result in reduced profits in base case levels for each strategy ranging from -2 percent to -13
percent, therefore making G  intensive strategies more attractive.  Conversely, lower premiums
L
result in percentage increases ranging from 2 to 12 percent.  As expected, the G  Intensive
S
strategy was the most sensitive to changes in premiums.  
 The standard deviation of E(ANP) was unaffected by changes in the G  premium level. 
S
The G  Intensive strategy displayed a relatively minor inverse relationship with changes in this
S
parameter. 
Carrying Costs.  Spatial, capital, storage, and risk costs are all components of the cost of
carrying grain.  Shippers are confronted with the challenge of balancing irregular levels of
shipping demand with variable delivery schedules, costly demurrage penalties, and fixed storage
capacities.  Costs of carrying grain stocks fluctuate with the grain market.  Price movements
(including basis and spreads), storage availability, and interest rates each affect the cost of
holding grain.  The carrying cost was set at 1 plus the current prime rate (8.25) in the base case. 
Excess carrying costs were set at the prime rate plus 4 percent to capture the added cost of
storage contingencies.  Simulations were conducted on a 50 percent increase and decrease in the
annual carrying cost level across shipping strategies.
Expected Annual Net Payoff had a mixed relationship with changes in the carrying costs
and was relatively unresponsive to changes in this parameter.  This relationship is a result of the
complexity of the shipping demand calculations and their relationship to price spreads, transport
costs, and carrying costs.  An increase (decrease) in the carrying cost led to 
-1 percent (-4 percent) changes in the expected payoff with the G  Intensive strategy.  The G
SL
Intensive strategy, however, had a positive relationship with changes in the carrying cost.  Here,
an increase (decrease) in carrying cost resulted in a 4 percent decrease (increase) in the payoff
level.  Lower carrying costs expand the horizons in which it is feasible to carry grain forward,
resulting in greater holding costs and risk in future basis movements.  Conversely, higher
carrying costs generate greater certainty in shipping demand and relatively higher total carrying
costs.                Appendix II provides figures which illustrate the sensitivity of Expected Annual Net Payoff for
17
these shipping strategies to changes in the forward/spot delivery ratio, carrying cost, general tariff, service
reliability, and G  premium levels.
S
23
Changes in the carrying cost had little effect on the standard deviation of Expected
Annual Net Payoff.  However, results did exhibit an inverse relationship with risk (see Table 7). 
Summary.  These results provide insight into effects of changes in key elements of
uncertainty and the relationships between G  and G  shipping strategies.  A number of general
SL
trends were identified as the shipping strategy makes greater use of G s.  First, reliability of
L
general tariff service has the greatest impact on expected payoff levels for the G  Intensive and
S
G  Mix strategies.  The discrete and random nature of the general allocation mechanism leads to
S
relatively large changes in E(ANP).   Second, G  premium changes have the greatest impact on
17 L
the G  Mix and G  Intensive strategies.  The contracted nature of the forward rate becomes more
LL
critical than the general tariff reliability as the shipping strategy becomes more long-term
intensive.  Third, grain purchases on forward contracts increase in importance as the shipper
becomes more G  orientated in strategy.  Uncertainty in spot purchases results in greater risk of
L
being understocked.  Securing stocks through forward contracts leads to greater E(ANP) and
lower risk.  Finally, G  premiums become less important as the shipping strategy becomes more
S
long-term.  However, shippers implementing G  strategies must consider the premium risks
S
associated with such positions. 
The G  Intensive (i.e., 0-G ) strategy consistently provided the highest E(ANP) in
SL
addition to the greatest risk.  Carrying cost, G  premiums, and tariff service reliability had little
S
impact on the standard deviation of risk.  The ratio of forward to spot purchases (F/S Ratio) had
the most influence on risk for each strategy.  However, such changes only have a significant
impact on E(ANP) with the G  Intensive strategy.  Integration of G s into a shipping strategy
LL  
result in less risk.24
CONCLUSIONS
The railcar market has evolved dramatically since the passage of the Staggers Rail Act
of 1980.  Railroads have addressed chronic problems with the introduction of several innovative
market-based allocation and ordering mechanisms.  As a result of these innovations, grain
marketing participants are confronted with three logistical options: general tariff, short-term
guarantees (G ), and long-term guarantees (G ).  Such forward guarantees (G s and G s) are
SLS L
attractive to shippers because of seasonal demand fluctuations in railcar demand.  Shippers must
consider among different combinations of these strategies to maximize expected profits,
recognizing that each strategy has different risks.
This study evaluated rail logistical options confronting grain shippers.  Analyses reveal
that as shipping strategies make greater use of short-term guarantees (G  Intensive strategies), 
S
the E(ANP) increases, as does risk.  Second, reliability of general tariff service has the greatest
impact on the expected payoff levels.  In addition, the ratio of  forward to spot grain purchases
has the most influence on standard deviation of E(ANP).  Such changes in the level of forward
contracts, however,  only affected E(ANP) with the G  Intensive strategy.  Hence, integration of
L
G  into a shipping strategy and contracting forward purchases results in lower risk.  However,
L
shippers must coordinate their forward car and grain positions.  
Results from this dynamic stochastic simulation model can put perspective on the
importance of the variables in this system.  This study illustrates the role of G  and G  strategies
SL
and their relationships to uncertainties in deliveries, premium levels, carrying costs, and tariff
reliability. 
Shippers
Some important implications can be identified for shippers. 
Integrating Merchandising and Forward Transportation Strategies
Shippers must develop forward strategies that integrate grain trading and logistics
strategies.  Shippers need to make projections of future car requirements based on projected grain
market conditions.  Coordination of expected grain purchases, sales, and shipping requirements
results in increased profits.  Grain shippers also need to accurately assess the general tariff
service reliability when developing forward logistical strategies.  In doing so, managers must
integrate grain marketing and transportation decision planning.  Indeed, these results illustrate
that grain merchandising decisions that are not integrated with forward shipping strategies are
highly risky and payoffs would be substantially less.  In the extreme, the 100 percent general
tariff shipping strategy would result in negative profits and the need to expand storage capacity.    
  It is important to note that the simulation results reflect a shipping year with market conditions
18
and peak railcar demand periods such as 1995-96.
25
Shipping Patterns
Implementing forward car ordering strategies has an effect on shipping patterns.  First,
as G  use increases, elevator shipping patterns become less governed by market spreads and more
L
by railcar commitments.  Such strategies remove a degree of market speculation and induce
shipments in otherwise “sub-optimal” shipping demand periods relative to the more flexible G
S
strategies.  As use of G s increases, shipping decisions become more governed by the grain
S
market conditions.  The value of G s rests with the strategic flexibility of this instrument to target
S
peak demand shipping periods. 
     
Risk Management
Mixed strategies, shipping a portion of shipments on long-term guarantees (G s),
L
increase stability in shipping patterns and reduce risk, up to a point.  As the shipper’s strategy
depends more on G s, risk diminishes, reaches a minimum and then increases.  Results for the
L
simulation suggest that longer term freight positions of 66-83 percent of annual shipments would
minimize risk for a shipper with logistical characteristics similar to a typical North Dakota
elevator.   Fixed G  strategies may be viewed as risk-reducing tools when used in conjunction
18 L
with adaptable G s.  Success of such efforts, however, ultimately depends on the accuracy of
S
shipping demand projections.  Since shipping positions are taken over a year in advance,
elevators ought to develop projections of minimum monthly shipping demands from which to fill
a portion with long-term contractual commitments.   
Demand Certainty
The importance of forward contracts for grain purchases escalates as shippers integrate grain
merchandising and transportation strategies.  Increased use of forward contracts reduces
uncertainty about forward shipping demand, making longer-term shipping options more
attractive and less risky.  Shipping strategies with longer-term guarantees require more planning
and scheduling of grain flows.  In this analysis, the ratio of grain purchases under forward
contract has a great impact on the expected payoffs levels and risk, particularly for G  Intensive
L
strategies.  Greater certainty in monthly grain stock levels through forward contracts reduces the
likelihood of shipper cancellation penalties.
Secondary Markets
Transferability of the forward instruments has led to the development of informal secondary
markets.  The emergence of transportation brokers and packages put together by grain trading
firms has created more options for the grain shipper.  Secondary markets can serve as a means of
adjusting the size of railcar positions.  Brokerage firms (e.g., Trade West, Joiner Co.) can serve26
as a source of added flexibility with any logistics strategy.  Shippers with greater uncertainty in
shipping needs can defer positions until demand becomes more apparent and purchase
instruments on the secondary market.  Risk-averse shippers can also reduce the degree of
uncertainty in primary market G  positions by purchasing instruments closer to the delivery
S
period.      
Railroads
Railroads must closely monitor the effectiveness of the design of these instruments. 
Objectives should be to develop and offer options for shippers.  Proper levels of shipper
cancellation and carrier default penalties must be monitored to ensure appropriate incentives are
present.   
Market-based allocation mechanisms have led to greater sophistication of logistical
decision making.  Options are likely to result in productivity gains that will benefit carriers. 
Most obvious is that the forward dimension of some shipping options provides incentives for
shippers to even out seasonal extremes, and concurrently provides less uncertainty and variability
in forward shipping demand for the carrier.       
Public Policy
 Guaranteed rail transportation services have generated a number of public policy
concerns.  First, results from this study indicate demand exists for forward guarantee mechanisms
in the grain industry.  Shippers which develop integrated logistical strategies can reduce
merchandising risk using these mechanisms.  Second, G  and G  instruments encourage greater
SL
sophistication of grain marketing decisions.  Forward guarantee mechanisms ration demand
during peak demand periods and level out shipping patterns.  Such developments generate
improvements in grain transportation efficiency which benefit shippers and carriers. 27
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Model Specification
The model used to represent the country elevator’s logistical system is given as:
                                       
given
     
where
ANP = Annual Net Payoff NET
%   = Monthly Minneapolis Net Payoff  Net 
MPLS
% = Monthly Pacific Northwest Net Payoff  Net 
PNW
R = Monthly Revenue on Minneapolis Grain Deliveries
MPLS
R = Monthly Revenue on Pacific Northwest Grain Deliveries
PNW
R =  Monthly Non-Performance Receipts from Carrier NP
TC S =  Monthly Short-term Guarantee Transportation Cost G
TC L =  Monthly Long-term Guarantee Transportation Cost G
TC =  Monthly Obligated General Tariff Transportation Cost OGT
HC =  Handling Cost
CC = Monthly Carrying Cost
TSCP = Monthly Total Shipper Cancellation Penalties
t = Month
Simulation Inputs
The number of iteration settings is specified under the simulation settings icon.  This
allows the specification of the number of iterations that will be executed during a simulation. 
During each iteration, all distribution functions are sampled.  Sample values are placed in the
worksheet formulation, and the worksheet is recalculated.  Values for the designated output fields
are saved in an output data set.  In @RISK, stable results probably need 300 to 500 iterations
(@RISK 1994).  For this analysis, simulations were set at 1000 iterations since all revenue and
cost components of the net payoff calculation converged at this level during the base case
analysis.    33
The preferred sampling type is also specified under the simulation settings icon as either
the Monte Carlo or Latin Hypercube method.  The Monte Carlo sampling technique selects
stratified sampling through an entirely random process.  Input distributions are recreated through
sampling.  Potential problems with this technique may surface when there are too few iterations
or a small likelihood of occurrence exists for an event.  Ranges of possible values may not be
represented in the distribution.  The Latin Hypercube sampling technique selects standard Monte
Carlo sampling within established ranges.  Samples are forced from equal intervals on the
cumulative probability scale.  This method employs “sampling without” replacement and forces
consideration of outlying events.  @RISK (1994) recommends the Latin Hypercube method
unless Monte Carlo simulation is explicitly needed.  The Latin Hypercube sampling technique
was selected for this model for these reasons.
A random number generator seed option is also under the simulation settings icon.  This
option permits the entry of a seed value for the random number generator so that the exact
sequence of random numbers will be applied across all simulations.  This function is important in
controlling the simulation environment to analyze the impact of parameter changes.  A seed of
1000 was set in the model.  
Simulation Outputs
@RISK provides statistics and data reports for both input and output variables.  The
statistics report displays the mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, and percentiles. 
The data report provides input and output calculations for each iteration conducted during the
simulation. @RISK also provides a sensitivity feature which identifies the most influential inputs
in the model.  Sensitivities are calculated using either regression analysis or rank correlations. 
Scenario analyzes are also performed on target variables.  This process identifies the inputs
within the simulation data set which meet the target value and are significant.  In addition,
@RISK provides graphing capabilities which summarize the input and output data collections.34
APPENDIX II






















































  “Relative sensitivity analysis” refers to the response of E(ANP) to equal percentage changes in
19
the given problem element parameters being evaluated.
35
Figure 14.  Sensitivity of Expected Annual Net Payoff to Changes in the Parameter Values for
the G  Intensive Strategy.
S
SENSITIVITY OF MODEL PARAMETERS ON SHIPPING STRATEGIES
The effect of forward/spot delivery, carrying cost, general tariff service reliability, G
S
premium level, and G  premium level are evaluated using sensitivity analysis.  Fifty percent
L
increases and decreases are introduced to present the relationship between changes in these
parameter values and their impact on the expected value of Annual Net Payoff and the standard
deviation across various shipping strategies.  G  Intensive (0-G ), G  Mixed (2-G ), G  Mixed (4-
SL S L L
G ), and G  Intensive (6-G ) strategies are evaluated with respect to changes in key elements of
LL L
uncertainty in this section.     
G  Intensive Strategy
S
Expected Value.  The G  Intensive Strategy is defined as the 0-G  mix on the spectrum
SL
of shipping strategies.  Under this shipping strategy, the country elevator relies solely on the G
S
market and the random general tariff allocation mechanism.  In the base case, this strategy had
the highest E(ANP) value of $582,085.  Relative sensitivity analysis  revealed that the expected
19
value of Annual Net Payoff ( E(ANP)) was most sensitive to general tariff service reliability and
G  premium levels.  Figure 14 illustrates the impact that 50 percent changes in the model
S
parameters have on the expected value of annual net payoff.36
Changes in general tariff service reliability exhibited a positive relationship with
E(ANP).  A 50 percent increase (decease) in the service reliability of general tariff cars results in
a $94,090 increase ($81,670 decrease) in E(ANP) due to the increased (decreased) shipments
made by general tariff and decreased (increased) in premiums paid for G .  This relationship
S
suggests that the random nature of general tariff allocations has a significant influence on the G
S
Intensive strategy.  
  G  premiums have a negative relationship with E(ANP).  A 50 percent increase
S
(decrease) in the G  premiums results in a $75,670 decrease ($72,030 increase) in E(ANP).  For
S
simplification, the model assumed that all G  were purchased on the primary market.  However,
S
changes in G  market conditions may significantly influence country elevator margins.  Primary
S
market G ’s can be purchased as far out as six months before the shipping period.  Deferring
S
purchases and relying on secondary markets with shorter windows could result in significantly
higher premiums.  Conversely, over-committing to primary market G  could result in the
S
payment of higher premiums than necessary.     
The forward/spot delivery ratios have relatively little impact on expected payoff levels. 
E(ANP) remained virtually fixed.  This suggests that the flexibility of this strategy is able to
withstand changes in the uncertainty of grain deliveries within the range of analysis. 
Carrying cost changes result in lower expected payoffs.  The 50 percent increase in the
carrying charge resulted in a marginal $6,390 decrease in E(ANP), while a decrease resulted in a
$25,460 decrease in the base case payoff level.  This counter-intuitive relationship with carrying
cost decreases is due to the more volatile nature of shipping demand that results from lower
carrying costs.  Lower carrying costs result in higher volumes of inventories and also higher total
annual carrying costs.
The G  Intensive strategy does not use the G  instrument.  For this reason, G  premiums
SL L
had no impact on the E(ANP).   
       Standard Deviation.  The standard deviation of E(ANP) for the base case level was
$2,209,116.  For the G  Intensive Strategy, the standard deviation of E(ANP) was most
S
responsive to the forward/spot delivery ratio.  Simulation results indicate that higher levels of
forward commitment, for a shipper in this environment, leads to lower levels of uncertainty in the
expected payoff value.  A 50 percent increase (decrease) in the base case forward delivery
percentage resulted in a $186,640 decrease ($206,740 increase) in the standard deviation of
E(ANP).  Carrying cost, general tariff service reliability, and G  premiums were less influential
S
on the standard deviation of E(ANP).  Again, G  premiums had no impact on this strategy. 
L














































Figure 15.  Sensitivity of the Expected Annual Net Payoff Standard Deviation to Changes in the
Parameter Values for the G  Intensive Strategy.
S
G  Mix Strategy
S
Expected Value.  The G  Mix strategy is defined as the 2-G  mix on the spectrum of
SL
shipping strategies described in the discussion of the base case.  Under this strategy, the shipper
takes a 2-G  position and relies on the G  market and the general tariff allocation mechanism to
LS
fill any other residual shipping demand.  Initially, the G  Mix strategy had an E(ANP) value of
S
$419,455 in the base case.  Relative sensitivity analyzes revealed that the expected value of
Annual Net Payoff (E(ANP)) for the G  Mix strategy was most sensitive to general tariff service
S
reliability and G  premium levels.  Figure 16 illustrates the effect that 50 percent changes in the
S
model’s parameter values have on the expected value of annual net payoff.
General tariff service reliability exhibits a positive relationship with E(ANP).  A
50 percent increase (decrease) in the reliability of general tariff cars resulted in a $92,580
increase ($80,840 decrease) in E(ANP).  These values are relatively close to the G  Intensive 
S
strategy.  This relationship suggests that the random nature of general tariff cars also has a
relatively significant influence on the G  Mix strategy.  However, increases in reliability have a
S
15 percent greater influence on E(ANP) than do decreases.  
  Like the G  Intensive strategy, G  premiums display an inverse relationship with
SS
E(ANP).  A 50 percent increase (decrease) in the G  premiums resulted in a $50,600 decrease
S
($47,430 increase) in E(ANP).  This was a $25,000 decrease in the responsiveness from the G
S
Intensive strategy.  G  market conditions have lower relative influence on the G  Mix strategy
S S
























































Figure 16.  Sensitivity of the Expected Annual Net Payoff to Changes in the Parameter Values
for the G  Mix Strategy.
S
G  premiums also have an inverse relationship with the E(ANP).  A 50 percent increase
L
(decrease) in the G  premiums resulted in a $36,680 decrease ( $36,670 increase) in E(ANP).     
S
Forward/spot delivery ratios has relatively little impact on expected payoff levels, as
E(ANP) remained virtually fixed at $24 million.  This relationship suggests that a monthly G
S
strategy adds flexibility and is able to withstand changes in the uncertainty of grain deliveries.   
Carrying cost changes result in lower expected payoffs.  A 50 percent increase in the
carrying charge resulted in a $9,080 decrease in E(ANP), while a 50 percent decrease resulted in
a $14,720 decrease in the base case payoff level.  This relationship is likely a result of the greater
deferment in shipping demand that results in the holding of greater inventory levels.  Further
increases in deferred shipping demand tend to be limited by grain stocks and storage capacity. 
Decreases in shipping demand that result from higher carrying costs are also limited by grain
positions.  The G  Mixed strategy was less responsive to changes in the carrying cost than the G
S S
Intensive strategy.
Standard Deviation.  The standard deviation of E(ANP) for the G   Mix strategy was
S
most responsive to the forward/spot delivery ratio.  Initially, the standard deviation of the base
case was $1,989,782.  A 50 percent increase (decrease) in the base case forward delivery
percentage resulted in over a $213,358 decrease ($232,445 increase) in the standard deviation of
E(ANP).  These findings suggest that greater levels of forward delivery commitments with the G
S
Mix result in lower Annual Net Payoff risk.  Carrying cost, general tariff service reliability, and
G  premiums were less influential on the standard deviation of E(ANP).  G  premiums had no
S L
impact on risk.  Figure 17 illustrates the impact that these elements have on the standard















































Figure 17.  Sensitivity of the Expected Annual Net Payoff Standard Deviation to Changes in
Parameter Values for the G  Mix Strategy.
S
G  Mix Strategy
L
Expected Value.  The G  Mix strategy is defined as the 4-G  level of forward
LL
commitment.  The country elevator takes a 4-G  position and relies on general tariff and G s for
LS
any residual monthly shipping demand that exceeded this position.  Initially, the G  Mix strategy
L
had an E(ANP) value of $254,275 in the base case.  Simulation results reveal that Expected
Annual Net Payoff (E(ANP)) is most sensitive to G  premium levels and general tariff service
L
reliability under the G  Mix shipping strategy.  A 50 percent increase (decrease) in the G
L L
premium level results in a $73,350 decrease ($73,340 increase) in E(ANP).  Conversely, a 50 
percent increase (decrease) in the reliability of general tariff cars results in a $68,480 increase
($70,060 decrease) in E(ANP).  Carrying cost and forward/spot deliveries had less influence on
E(ANP).  Figure 18 present the relationships between changes in the parameter values and
E(ANP).
Standard Deviation.  Under the G  Mix, the standard deviation of E(ANP) is most
L
responsive to the forward/spot delivery ratio.  The base case level had a standard deviation of
$1,835,187.  This strategy was the closest to the minimum risk level in the base case analysis.  A
50 percent increase (decrease) in the base case forward delivery percentage results in a $237,953
decrease ($258,638 increase) in the standard deviation of E(ANP).  Carrying cost, general tariff
service reliability, and G  premiums were less influential on the standard deviation of E(ANP). 
S
G  premiums also had no impact on risk.  These findings are consistent with the other evaluated
L
shipping strategies.  Figure 19 illustrates the relationship between the model’s parameter values





































































































Figure 18.  Sensitivity of Expected Annual Net Payoff to Changes in the Parameter Values for
the G  Mix Strategy. 
L
Figure 19.  Sensitivity of the Expected Annual Net Payoff Standard Deviation to Changes in the

























































Figure 20.  Sensitivity of Expected Annual Net Payoff to Changes in Parameter Values for the
G  Intensive Strategy.  
L
G  Intensive Strategy
L
Expected Value.  The G  Intensive strategy is defined as the 6 G  shipping position in
LL
the base case.  Under this strategy, the country elevator is assumed to have engaged in contracted
deliveries of six 26-car unit trains per month.  Residual shipping demand, if 
present, is filled with general tariff receipts and G .  In the base case analysis, this strategy 
S
has the lowest E(ANP) level of - $248,335.  This is due to the swings in shipping demand and
high shipper cancellation penalties.  Sensitivities revealed that G  premiums had the greatest
L
impact on E(ANP) for the G  Intensive strategy.  A 50 percent increase (decrease) in G
L L
premiums results in a $110,020 decrease (increase) in E(ANP).  
The analysis suggests also that E(ANP) is influenced by the reliability of general tariff
services and forward contracted delivery levels.  A 50 percent increase (decrease) in general tariff
service reliability results in a $77,290 decrease ($71,540 increase) in E(ANP).  This inverse
relationship with general tariff service reliability is due to the increase in shipper cancellation
penalties.  A 50 percent increase (decrease) in the base case level of forward contracted deliveries
results in a $29,330 increase ($25,770 decrease) in E(ANP).   The sensitivity of changes in
forward delivery levels increases as the number of G s increases.  Figure 20 presents the results
L

















































Figure 21.  Sensitivity of the Expected Annual Net Payoff Standard Deviation to Changes in the
Parameter Values for the G  Mix Strategy.
L
Standard Deviation.  Like the other cases, the standard deviation of E(ANP) for the G  
L
Intensive strategy is most responsive to the forward/spot delivery ratio.  The base case standard
deviation was $1,900,693.  A 50 percent increase (decrease) in the base case forward delivery
percentage for this strategy results in a $261,648 decrease ($278,231 increase) in the standard
deviation of E(ANP).  These findings suggest that greater levels of forward delivery
commitments result in lower risk in Annual Net Payoff.  The standard deviation of E(ANP) was
relatively inelastic to carrying cost, general tariff service reliability, and G  premiums.  G
SL
premiums had no impact on the standard deviation of E(ANP).  Figure 21 illustrates the impact
that these elements have on the standard deviation of E(ANP). 